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The FAA versus the Magnuson–Moss
Warranty Act: Which Warrants
Precedence?
Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery1

I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has been an integral part of American jurisprudence since the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925.2 Often described as “a
speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute resolution,” arbitration has
become a common alternative to litigation.3 While the FAA and arbitration have
continued to gain favor, some scholars have argued that adhering to arbitration
agreements may occasionally produce negative policy, especially when such adherence conflicts with congressional statutes.4 A specific instance of this controversy is whether such adherence conflicts with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(MMWA), a federal statute which addresses how consumers may pursue breach of
warranty claims. In facing these issues, courts are in the unenviable position of
determining whether the statutes are reconcilable, and if not, which statute warrants precedence.
These questions have proven to be a formidable foe for the judiciary. Moreover, courts and commentators have been divided as to what answer will produce
the best policy. In 2002, the discussion seemed to be headed toward conclusion
after the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits found that the FAA should trump the
MMWA in the event of statutory conflict. However, with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, this polarizing issue has once
again become a focus in American jurisprudence. While the Ninth Circuit has
recently withdrawn Kolev sua sponte,5 it is doubtful that the Ninth Circuit is abandoning the issue as it has delayed subsequent submissions of Kolev until the California Supreme Court delivers its decision in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co.,
LLC.6 Thus, an understanding of Kolev is vital to grasping both the current and
future landscape of MMWA arbitrability. This paper asserts that not only is
___________________________
1. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
3. Joyce J. George, The Advantages of Administered Arbitration When Going It Alone Just Won’t
Do, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 68 (2002) (noting the cost and time savings arbitration provides as well as
the ability for parties to structure the process governing their disputes).
4. Daniel G. Lloyd, The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act v. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2003); Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the
Federal Titas: The Federal Arbitration Act v. The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act Will The Consumer
Win or Lose?, 13 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 33 (2001).
5. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
6. Id.; Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, petition for review granted, 272 P.3d
976 (Cal. 2012).
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Kolev’s legal reasoning inaccurate, but its policy manifestations would have been
flawed as well.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff Diana Kolev filed suit in the District Court for the Central District of
California against Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, Motorcars West LLC, HM
Gray Family II Inc., Gray Family II LLC, Bennett Automotive I Inc., Bennett
Automotive II Inc. (the Dealership) and Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (Porsche) (collectively, the Defendants).7 Upon purchasing the vehicle from the Dealership, Kolev signed a formal sales contract with the Dealership, agreeing to arbitrate certain disputes arising from the transaction.8 In her complaint, Kolev alleged
breach of implied and express warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
(MMWA)9 and breach of contract and unconscionability under California’s Consumer Warranty Act10 and California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act.11 Kolev
argued that both the Dealership and the manufacturer, Porsche, sold her a “certified” used car that was not eligible to be certified; she experienced various problems that should have been covered under the original factory warranty; and both
Porsche and the dealer refused to repair them.12 Additionally, Kolev argued the
contract was substantively unconscionable because arbitration fees of at least
$15,000 exceeded the cost of litigation and she could not afford to pay those
fees.13 Kolev also alleged several other substantive defects in the sales contract,
including: 1) an impermissible class action waiver, 2) a clause imposing all costs
of arbitration on Kolev should she lose, 3) a one-sided appeal provision favoring
the Defendants, 4) no provision providing Kolev with a waiver of fees, and 5) a
provision allowing the dealership to litigate claims it was most likely to bring
while compelling Kolev to pursue claims she was most likely to bring in arbitration.14
Responding to Kolev’s complaint, the Defendants filed a petition to compel
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the original sales contract, and also
filed a motion to stay the action against Porsche.15 Kolev opposed the motion to
compel, arguing that the sales contract was procedurally unconscionable because
it was one of adhesion between two parties of unequal bargaining power and because the arbitration agreement was light in print and hidden.16 Kolev objected to
___________________________
7. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1025.
8. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Kolev, 658 F.3d 1024 (No. 09-55963).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794 (2011).
11. Id. § 1750.
12. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 4-5.
13. Id. at 5; Appellee’s Response Brief at 11, Kolev, 658 F.3d 1024 (No. 09-55963). Defendants
argued that: 1) Kolev’s actual filing fees would be only a couple hundred dollars and both the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) require the Defendants
in this action to pay all fees incurred beyond the initial filing fee; and 2) both the AAA and California
law allowed Kolev to exercise a waiver of fees as well as prevent an arbitrator from awarding costs to
a defendant should the complainant lose. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(a), (b) (2011).
14. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 5.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 13, at 4-16. Defendants argued that: 1) the
sales contract at issue was not an adhesion contract but a form contract whose provisions were nego-
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the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, arguing that her claims for injunctive relief and other claims alleged under the MMWA were not arbitrable as a
matter of law.17 Finally, Kolev argued that the motion to compel should be denied
because the Defendants had failed to show that she ever agreed to arbitrate any
dispute.18
The district court granted Kolev’s claim for injunctive relief and stayed the
litigation against Porsche, but denied Kolev’s other objections and granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all other claims.19 An arbitrator awarded
Kolev some substantive relief20 but resolved all other claims in favor of the Defendants.21
Kolev appealed the court order confirming the arbitration award to the Ninth
Circuit, alleging the aforementioned flaws in the district court’s grant of the Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, as well as novel allegations of flaws in the
arbitrator’s decision-making.22 In evaluating the case, the Ninth Circuit focused
almost exclusively on Kolev’s assertion that the MMWA barred arbitration of her
complaint and held that written warranty provisions that mandate pre-dispute
binding arbitration of consumer claims are invalid under the MMWA.23 The court
cited Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulation 703,24 which the court interpreted as barring arbitration of MMWA claims.25 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit
noted that because Congress had not specifically addressed the issue before the
court and the FTC regulation was reasonable, the court should show deference to
the FTC.26 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the
district court.27

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) to
address widespread exploitation of express warranties and disclaimers by mer___________________________
tiable, and 2) the arbitration provisions contained in the contract were not hidden but were in bold,
easy to find, and accessible to Kolev at the time of purchase. Id. at 7-8.
17. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
18. Id.
19. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011).
20. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 8, at 6-7. The arbitrator ordered the Defendants to change
the springs on the vehicle back to factory springs. Id.
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 7-8. Kolev argued that the arbitrator improperly found Defendants had not violated California’s Consumer Warranty Act because the arbitrator improperly found that intent was necessary for
culpability under the Act. Id. at 7.
23. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031 (“[W]e need not address Kolev's additional contentions that the arbitration clause was unconscionable under California law and that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting and relying on the sales contract authenticated by a principal of the Dealership and by compelling arbitration of her claims against the Dealership while staying the action against Porsche.”)
24. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 (2009).
25. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1026.
26. Id. at 1026-31.
27. Id. at 1031.
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chants.28 The Act requires sellers using written express warranties as advertising
and merchandising devices to meet federal standards that guarantee certain remedies be provided to aggrieved consumers.29 To prevail in an action brought under
the MMWA, the consumer bears the burden of establishing that the damages
resulted from the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor’s failure to adhere to
provisions of the written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.30 The
MMWA encourages warrantors to establish procedures for consumers’ disputes so
that they may be fairly and expeditiously settled through “informal dispute settlement mechanisms.”31 In establishing the MMWA, Congress expressly delegated
rulemaking authority under the statute to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).32
In finding that the MMWA did not specifically address the validity of predispute binding arbitration, the Kolev court looked to the landmark Supreme Court
case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.33 to
discern whether requiring such arbitration was permissible.34

B. Agency Deference
In Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, which imposed national air quality standards, vis-à-vis the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), on states that had not yet enacted air quality regulations.35 The legislation required such states to establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.36 The EPA later
amended the Clean Air Act to allow an existing plant to get permits for new
equipment that did not meet standards, as long as the total emissions from the
plant itself did not increase.37 In response, the plaintiff, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, filed suit against the EPA claiming its Clean Air Act was contrary to other EPA legislation, and therefore impermissible.38 The issue before the
Court became whether to grant deference to a government agency's (in this instance, the EPA’s) construction of a statute which it administers.39
The Court began by noting that the amended Clean Air Act originally did not
expressly define “stationary source,” nor was there any legislative history to shed
light on the phrase.40 Therefore, uncertainty existed as to which entities the permit
program should apply.41 To decide the issue, the Court created a two prong test.42
First, the Court looked to “whether Congress [had] directly spoken to the precise
___________________________
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

59 A.L.R. FED. 461, § 2(a) (1982).
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2006).
See id. § 2310(a)(2).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 2778-79.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (2006).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 2780.
Id.
Id. at 2781, 2786.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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question at issue.”43 If Congress had done so, then the analysis would end and
effect must be given to the clearly expressed intent of Congress.44 However, if
Congress had not addressed the question at issue, and an administrative interpretation did address the issue, the Court would then ask whether the administrative
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.45
Applying this test, the Supreme Court ultimately denied the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that the statute did not expressly define “stationary source,” that the
EPA’s interpretation of such was permissible, and, therefore, that deference
should be given to the EPA’s statutory construction.46 After nearly three decades,
the two-step process developed in Chevron is still the applicable test for evaluating administrative interpretations and the case is widely considered the harbinger
for the Supreme Court’s approach to deference.47
While Chevron resolved the issue of how courts should approach administrative regulations, it did so in a vacuum; that is, its holding is dispositive only when
the administrative regulation is the sole issue before the court.48

C. When the MMWA and FAA Conflict
A more complex issue for courts has arisen when the proper exercise of administrative deference or adherence to the principles of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) would yield conflicting holdings.49 The Fifth Circuit addressed such a
conflict in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC.50 In Walton, the plaintiffs, the
Waltons, purchased a mobile home manufactured by the defendant, Southern Energy Homes, Inc. from the seller-defendant, Rose Mobile Homes.51 Southern Energy issued the Waltons a one-year manufacturer's warranty against defects in
materials and workmanship.52 The warranty contained an arbitration provision
requiring the Waltons to submit any claims under the warranty to binding arbitration.53 After finding several defects in their newly purchased home, the Waltons
demanded that the defects be fixed.54 However, the repairs were never completed
to the Waltons’ satisfaction.55 The Waltons’ dissatisfaction led them to file suit in
the Circuit Court of Kemper County, Mississippi, alleging infringement of the
___________________________
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2782.
46. Id. at 2793.
47. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 971 (1992).
48. See Chevron, 467 U.S at 2778-82.
49. Gary B. Born & Adam Raviv, Arbitration Agreement Versus Agency Deference, Kluwer Law
International,
http://kluwer.practicesource.com/blog/2012/arbitration-agreements-versus-agencydeference/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (“If a federal agency reads an ambiguous statute as allowing it to
prohibit arbitration, should that interpretation be granted the normal deference afforded agencies under
Chevron?”).
50. 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002).
51. Id. at 471.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 472.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, among other violations.56 In response to the suit,
the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of the Waltons’ claims.57 The
district court denied the defendants’ motion, finding that the MMWA precluded
the defendants from requiring the Waltons to submit their written warranty claims
to binding arbitration.58 The defendants timely appealed the circuit court’s order.59
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that
as a result of a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” the Supreme Court has
interpreted the FAA as establishing a “presumption in favor of the enforceability
of contractual arbitration agreements.”60 The court stated that the party seeking to
avoid arbitration must exhibit Congress’ intent to proscribe a “waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue” in order to circumvent arbitration and
litigate their claims.61 In determining whether Congress intended such preclusion,
the Fifth Circuit employed the McMahon test,62 which relies on three factors to
determine Congress’ intent in enacting a statute: 1) the statute's text; 2) its legislative history; and 3) whether there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and
the statute's underlying purposes.63
The court then turned to the issue of whether the Waltons had met their burden.64 Evaluating the text of the statute, the Fifth Circuit found that the MMWA
“permits warrantors to establish ‘informal dispute settlement procedures’ for
breach of written warranty claims and to require consumers to resort to such procedures before bringing a civil action.”65 Noting that the term “informal dispute
settlement procedure” was not defined anywhere in the text of the Act, the court
noted that the FTC is instructed to “prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated
into the terms of a written warranty.”66 Reviewing the FTC regulation, the court
noted that informal dispute settlement procedures under the MMWA are not legally binding, and therefore, written warranties cannot confine consumer redress to
binding arbitration.67
___________________________
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 473.
60. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
61. Id.
62. Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (holding that the Arbitration Act establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration, requiring that the courts rigorously enforce
arbitration agreements). The Court stated, in relevant part:
This duty . . . is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on
statutory rights . . . . [T]he . . . Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional
command . . . [but] the burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue . . . . [S]uch intent
may be discernible from the statute's text, history, or purposes.
Id. at 226-27.
63. Id. at 227; Walton, 298 F.3d at 474.
64. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474.
65. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (2006).
66. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474-75; 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2).
67. Walton, 298 F.3d at 474-75 (“[T]here is nothing in the Rule which precludes the use of any other
remedies by the parties following a Mechanism decision . . . . However, reference within the written
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Having ascertained the FTC’s stance on arbitrability of warranty claims, the
Fifth Circuit turned its attention to the two-prong Chevron test to determine
whether deference should be given to the FTC promulgation.68 The court’s analysis ended after the first prong of Chevron when it found that Congress expressed
clear intent in favor of arbitration of contractual claims.69 Therefore, the FTC’s
regulation was moot.70
Finding that Congress had directly spoken to the issue of arbitrability of consumer claims,71 the Fifth Circuit found the FTC regulation failed the first prong of
Chevron72 and reversed the district court’s holding, granting the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.73
This interaction between the FTC’s regulation (which bars mandatory arbitration provisions in warranty contracts) and Congress’ support of the FAA (which
favors arbitration) was also reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Southern
Energy Homes, Inc.74 With facts almost identical to those in Walton, Davis involved plaintiffs who, after purchasing their mobile home from defendant Southern Energy Homes, found several defects with the new home.75 The plaintiffs filed
suit alleging, among other infringements, violation of the MMWA.76 In response,
the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the binding arbitration agreement contained in the manufactured home's written warranty.77
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by evaluating the text of the MMWA
and finding that while the MMWA did not define “informal dispute settlement
procedure,” it did provide that if a warrantor incorporates an informal dispute
settlement procedure into the warranty, the provision needed to comply with the
minimum requirements prescribed by the FTC.78 The court proceeded to evaluate
the FAA and its provisions, noting that if a party has signed an arbitration agreement,
the party should be held to [the agreement] unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue . . . . Thus, unless Congress has clearly expressed
an intention to preclude arbitration of the statutory claim, a party is
bound by its agreement to arbitrate.79
Like the Walton court, the Eleventh Circuit then turned to the McMahon test
to determine whether Congress intended to preclude arbitration of MMWA
___________________________
warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act.”); FTC Informal
Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. 703.3 (2009).
68. Walton, 298 F.3d. at 475.
69. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
70. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
71. Walton, 298 F.3d at 475
72. Id.
73. Id. at 478.
74. 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 1270.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1272; 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2006).
79. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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claims.80 First, the Eleventh Circuit found that the text of the MMWA did not
expressly proscribe arbitration.81 Second, legislative history regarding the
MMWA also failed to address arbitration and was ambiguous at best on the topic.82 Finally, under the McMahon test, the court found that none of the three purposes of the MMWA conflicted with that of the FAA.83 Thus, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to show discernible congressional intent to bar the
arbitrability of MMWA claims.84
Having found that the McMahon test did not bar arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit, as the Fifth Circuit did in Walton, subsequently turned to the Chevron test to
determine whether the FTC’s regulation barred arbitration of MMWA claims.85 At
this point the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ reasoning parted ways. While the Walton court found that Congress had expressed a clear intention favoring arbitrability
of MMWA claims, the Eleventh Circuit found that Congress had not expressed
any clear intent on the issue.86 Thus, while the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
FTC’s regulation failed Chevron’s initial prong, the Eleventh Circuit decided the
regulation survived.87
However, this distinction in reasoning did not cause opposing outcomes, because the Davis court found that the FTC regulation was unreasonable and, therefore, failed the second prong of the Chevron test.88 The Eleventh Circuit found the
FTC regulation barring arbitration of MMWA claims to be unreasonable because
it conflicted with Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring arbitration, and therefore
was not entitled to judicial deference.89 Finding both that the FTC regulation barring arbitration of MMWA claims was unreasonable under the Chevron test and a
lack of any Congressional intent to bar arbitration of MMWA claims under the
McMahon test, the Davis court ultimately agreed with the Fifth Circuit and likewise granted defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.90
While determining the proper interaction between the MMWA, FAA, Chevron, and McMahon has not been easy for courts, it did appear that the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits had resolved the issue and established firm pro-arbitration precedence regarding the MMWA.91 Given that Walton and Davis not only reached
the same conclusion but that each case did so in a similar manner seemed to have
___________________________
80. Id.; see also Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). The
McMahon opinion spelled out the following sources of authority: 1) the statute's text; 2) its legislative
history; and 3) whether there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes. Id.
81. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1274.
82. Id. at 1275-76.
83. Id. at 1276 (“The MMWA expressly states three purposes: ‘to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products.’ These purposes are not in conflict with the FAA. In fact, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly enforced arbitration of statutory claims where the underlying purpose of the statutes is to
protect and inform consumers.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
84. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1277.
85. See supra note 67.
86. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278.
87. Id.; Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2002).
88. Davis, 305 F.3d at 1280.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See generally Walton, 298 F.3d 470; Davis, 305 F.3d 1268.
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put the issue to rest. However, a decade later the Ninth Circuit and Kolev have
seemingly revived the issue.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its analysis in Kolev by
stating that while the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) does not specifically address arbitration, Congress had delegated rulemaking authority under the
Act to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).92 The court further noted that the
FTC, pursuant to its rulemaking authority, construed the MMWA as proscribing
mandatory arbitration of claims brought under the Act.93 Finding the MMWA
ambiguous on the issue and the FTC regulation on point, the court invoked the
Chevron test to determine whether deference should be granted to the administrative promulgation.94
Addressing the initial prong of Chevron, the court, citing Walton and Davis,
noted that both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agreed Congress had not manifested an express intent over whether MMWA claims were arbitrable.95 Finding that
the regulation passed the first prong, the court subsequently turned to the second
prong of Chevron to determine whether the regulation was reasonable.96 In addressing this issue, the Kolev court cited to various provisions of the FTC promulgation constructing a framework whereby mechanisms under the MMWA are
“informal dispute settlement procedure[s] which [are] incorporated into the terms
of a written warranty,”97 and that such mechanisms, including arbitration, are not
binding on the consumer and do not prevent the consumer from pursuing other
legal remedies such as litigation.98 In evaluating whether the FTC regulation was a
reasonable construction of the MMWA, the court noted the FTC’s explanation,
purporting that Congress’ intent was to bar arbitration of MMWA claims.99 Additionally, the FTC asserted that even if Congress had intended to allow arbitration
of such claims, the FTC was not prepared to set out guidelines to address such a
system.100
The Ninth Circuit found the FTC explanation persuasive for three reasons.101
First, at least according to the FTC advisory note, the regulation was promulgated
in accordance with Congress’ intent to bar arbitration under the MMWA.102 Second, the court stated that in enacting the MMWA, Congress sought to address the
inequality in bargaining power between merchants and consumers by providing
___________________________
92. Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion
withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2006).
93. Id.; FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1, 703.5 (2009).
94. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1025-27.
95. Id. at 1026 (citing Walton, 298 F.3d at 475; Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(e)).
98. Id. (citing FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(g)(1)).
99. Id. (citing FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3)).
100. Id. at 1026-27.
101. Id. at 1027.
102. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

9

File: Beckerle 10.30

654

Created on: 10/30/2012 12:28:00 PM
Last Printed: 6/12/2013 6:50:00 PM
Journal of Dispute Resolution,
Vol. 2012, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 10

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2012

consumers with access to more reasonable and effective remedies.103 Barring
mandatory binding arbitration furthers that aim because it protects consumers
from being forced into involuntary agreements they cannot negotiate.104 Third, the
court found that, according to Supreme Court precedent, the thirty-five year old
regulations warranted deference because they represented a longstanding, consistent interpretation of the statute.105 Determining that the FTC regulations barring mandatory arbitration of consumer contracts were reasonable, the Ninth Circuit concluded that deference to the regulation should be shown.106 After resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit immediately turned its attention to addressing
possible attacks on its reasoning.107
In dicta, the Kolev court acknowledged the current Supreme Court’s stance
favoring a liberal policy of arbitration, but cited the McMahon test for the proposition that agreements to arbitrate may be overridden by contrary congressional
command.108 Applying this test, the court explained why the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits erred in holding that Congress had not expressed intent to bar mandatory
arbitration of MMWA claims.109 Addressing the Walton decision, the Ninth Circuit claimed it was unprecedented to discern Congress’ intent for one statute, the
MMWA, by looking at another previous statute, the FAA.110 With respect to the
Davis decision, the Ninth Circuit explained that the FTC regulation was reasonable for the aforementioned reasons,111 but also because the FTC regulation differed from other administrative regulations which had failed to rebut the FAA’s
pro-arbitration assumption.112
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling to compel
arbitration and remanded the case back to the district court, holding that mandatory arbitration provisions are invalid under the MMWA.113
___________________________
103. Id. (citing H.R.REP. No. 93–1107, at 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7702).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1028 (citing Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 490 (5th Cir. 2002)
(King, C.J., dissenting); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (“A court may accord great
weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administration . . . [because] agency interpretations that are of long standing come before us with a certain credential of reasonableness, since it is rare that error would long persist.”).
106. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1029.
107. See id. at 1029-31.
108. Id. at 1029; see generally Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 (1987). The FAA's mandate to
enforce arbitration agreements, “[l]ike any statutory directive, may be overridden by a contrary congressional command.” Id.
109. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1029.
110. Id. (citing Walton, 298 F.3d at 483 (King, C.J., dissenting)).
111. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
112. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1030-31. The court supported its conclusion with the following reasons: 1)
“in none [of the rejected statutes] did an authorized agency construe the statute to bar pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration”; 2) none of the rejected statutes had Congressional language relating to possibly
barring mandatory arbitration whereas the MMWA does; and 3) Congress, in the MMWA, “explicitly
preserve[d]” a consumer’s right to pursue statutory claims in a judicial setting. Id. at 1030. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that the
Sherman Antitrust Act invalidly conflicts with the FAA); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-38 (holding that
the Securities Exchange Act invalidly conflicts with the FAA); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp, 500 U.S. 20, 26-35 (1991) (holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act invalidly
conflicts with the FAA).
113. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031.
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B. Judge Smith’s Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Smith criticized the majority for misconstruing the FTC
regulation and ignoring precedent.114 Addressing the alleged flaws in the majority’s statutory interpretation, Judge Smith cited FTC promulgations to bolster his
argument, first noting that Congress made informal dispute resolution procedures,
or mechanisms, a prerequisite to filing suit to encourage expeditious resolution of
claims under the MMWA.115 Second, Judge Smith asserted that the arbitration
remedy at issue was not a mechanism in accordance with the FTC regulations
because the arbitration agreement is an alternative, not a prerequisite, to litigation.116 Third, Judge Smith stated that while the majority was correct in finding
that the FTC regulation disapproves of binding non-judicial remedies in written
warranties, the regulation only pertains to warranties that incorporate one of the
defined mechanisms.117 Expounding on his second point, Judge Smith found that
because the arbitration agreement at issue was not a mechanism as defined by the
FTC, it was outside the purview of the FTC regulations.118
The dissent then turned its attention to the majority’s second holding: Chevron deference was appropriate in this case.119 First, Smith argued the Chevron test
was inappropriate because Congress never delegated authority to the FTC to regulate non-judicial remedies unless those remedies qualified as mechanisms.120 Having found that the arbitration agreement at issue was not such a mechanism, Judge
Smith stated that Congress delegated no authority to the FTC concerning the matter at issue and deference was patently incorrect.121
Finally, Judge Smith found that even if the FTC had the authority to regulate
the arbitration agreement in this instance, and such regulations could be construed
to bar that arbitration, it would be unreasonable to do so in light of contemporary
principles and approaches to the FAA.122 To find otherwise would create an unnecessary conflict between the federal circuits as well as between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court.123

___________________________
114. Id. at 1031-32 (Smith, J., dissenting).
115. Id.; Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of MMWA, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,701
(Apr. 22, 1999)
116. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1031-32. (“The Agreement provides that (1) disputes will ‘be resolved by
neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action;’ (2) ‘[t]he arbitrator's award shall be final and
binding on all parties’; and (3) ‘any appeal, if permitted by the terms of the agreement, will be to a
three-arbitrator panel, not to a court of law.’”); see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2006).
117. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1035.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (“[A]n agency may not
bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction . . . .”) (citations omitted)).
121. Id. at 1036 (citing Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1031 (“In a departure from Supreme Court precedent, the prevailing view of our sister
circuits, and applicable statutes, the majority opinion nullifies nearly every binding, non-judicial warranty dispute remedy adopted by private parties in this circuit.”).
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V. COMMENT
A. The Ninth Circuit Incorrectly Decided Kolev
The Ninth Circuit erred in four ways in reaching its decision that the MMWA
bars mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. First, the court was incorrect in applying
the Chevron test because the FTC promulgation did not apply to the mandatory
arbitration agreement at issue. Second, even if the FTC promulgation applied to
the arbitration agreement, the FTC did not have the required statutory authority to
make its promulgation. Third, even if it was proper to apply the Chevron test, the
facts of the case should not survive the Chevron test because Congress has spoken
directly on the issue via the FAA. Finally, even if the FTC had the requisite statutory authority to make its promulgation, the promulgation is not a permissible
interpretation of the MMWA because it conflicts both with the MMWA itself and
Supreme Court precedent.
The most severe flaw in Kolev was the Ninth Circuit finding that the FTC
regulation survived the Chevron test.124 The MMWA “encourage[s] warrantors to
establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms.”125 The MMWA also delegates to the FTC the power to determine minimum requirements for such mechanisms.126 At first glance, this would seem to afford the FTC the grounds with
which to make its promulgation barring pre-dispute binding arbitration. However,
the Ninth Circuit overlooked a congressional regulation accompanying the
MMWA stating that nothing in the Act prevents parties from agreeing to some
other avenue of redress other than a mechanism, if they choose to do so.127 The
regulation also explicitly states that such avenues of redress include binding arbitration.128 The Kolev court was further misled by MMWA language stating a
“consumer [may] resort to such [informal dispute mechanism] procedure before
pursuing any legal remedy.”129 The Ninth Circuit interprets this language to allow
plaintiffs to first pursue an informal dispute mechanism, such as arbitration, and
then later pursue litigation. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning misconstrues the
purpose of arbitration: it is an alternative to judicial proceedings, not a segue to
them.130 It may have been this policy pitfall that encouraged Congress to supplement the MMWA with a regulation reserving the right to binding arbitration, but
regardless of Congress’ motive for the regulation, it explicitly announced that
binding arbitration is not a mechanism but a procedure available under the
MMWA.131 For this reason, the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the Chevron test
and, therefore, should have affirmed the district court’s order to compel arbitration.
___________________________
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 2310(a)(2).
FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3 (2009).
Id.
Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1030 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C)).
Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3; Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
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The Ninth Circuit was also incorrect in evaluating whether the FTC promulgation warranted judicial deference in accordance with the Chevron test because
the FTC never had the authority to make its promulgation in the first place. Congress did not delegate to the FTC the power to regulate all alternative dispute resolution avenues; it only empowered the FTC to regulate mechanisms.132 As the
dissent accurately noted, the arbitration remedy at issue in Kolev was not a mechanism as defined by the MMWA and was, therefore, outside the purview of the
FTC’s control.133 Thus, Congress never delegated to the FTC the power to control
the arbitration provision at issue and applying the Chevron test was error.134
In finding that Congress had not spoken directly on the issue of binding arbitration in accordance with step one of the Chevron test, the Kolev court overlooked the most obvious example of congressional intent, the FAA.135 The Ninth
Circuit was correct in noting that the MMWA, at least on its face, does not specifically address its stance on binding arbitration.136 However, even in the absence of
a federal regulation allowing or proscribing binding arbitration, the court should
have acknowledged the FAA as evincing Congress’ intent to permit binding arbitration.137 Thus, Kolev’s conclusion that the FTC regulation survived the Chevron
test is misguided.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that the FTC’s regulation was a
permissible construction of the MMWA. Not only does the regulation directly
conflict with the FAA but it also flies in the face of recent Supreme Court precedent which has repeatedly taken a liberal approach to arbitration.138 While the
inaccurate resolution of complex legal issues such as the determination of agency
deference and the construction of an ineptly written statute are understandable
missteps, it is still hard to imagine how the Ninth Circuit could deliver an opinion
so antithetical to Supreme Court jurisprudence.

B. The Implications of Kolev
1. The Difficulty in Determining Whether
MMWA Claims May Be Arbitrated
While the Kolev court was misguided in its reasoning, it is certainly not the
only culprit. Congress’ initial failure to properly define “mechanisms” left a major
unresolved question in the application of the MMWA. The difficulty courts faced
in resolving this issue increased exponentially with a legislative promulgation that
___________________________
132. FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3; Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
133. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1033 (Smith, J., dissenting); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(B).
134. Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
135. Id.
136. See FTC Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures, 16 C.F.R. § 703.3.
137. Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1026; Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
138. Born & Raviv, supra note 49; Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227
(1987). If a party wants to show that another federal law limits the pro-arbitration scope of the FAA,
“[t]he burden is on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Id. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 n.21 (1985) (noting that courts should recognize “subjectmatter exceptions” to arbitrability only where Congress has “expressly directed the courts to do so”).
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advocated arbitration of MMWA claims as a prerequisite to litigation.139 The issue
with this is that one of the central features of arbitration is that it is a final award;
it is by nature an alternative to the judicial process, not a precursor.140 This language has “muddied the waters” and made MMWA analysis under the McMahon
or Chevron tests very difficult for courts.141
Although the means used by the Ninth Circuit in Kolev appear flawed, questions over whether its end propagates good policy represent a more controversial
topic.142 Critics expounding on Kolev’s possible policy implications tend to fall
into one of two factions: those who argue that the FAA should rule and MMWA
claims should be arbitrable, and those who argue that consumer protection should
rule and MMWA claims should not be arbitrable.143
The leaders of the pro-arbitrability sentiment have argued that the United
States, as a signatory to the New York Convention144 and other international arbitration conventions,145 should be committed to recognizing and upholding arbitration agreements.146 Allowing courts to defeat arbitration via contrary administrative regulations does not instill trust in other signatory countries which expect
arbitration agreements to be honored.147 Moreover, tainting the integrity of arbitration in the U.S. could have a substantial adverse effect on foreign investment and
wealth creation.148 Consistent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate provides
assurance to investors from signatory countries that disputes arising from their
transactions will be resolved by arbitration. Resolving issues through a transnational procedure like arbitration, with rules influenced by each signatory nation,
establishes perceptions of fairness and reliability, thus reducing investors’ risks
___________________________
139. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 41 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723 (“An adverse
decision in any informal dispute settlement proceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on the
warranty involved in the proceeding.”); see Higgs v. The Warranty Group, No. C2-02-1092, 2007 WL
2034376 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2007); Rickard v. Teynor's Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Ohio
2003); Browne v. Kine Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Va. 2002); Koons Ford of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722 (Md. 2007); Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644
S.E.2d 663 (S.C. 2007); Tucker v. Ford Motor Co., CL-2006-2827, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 24 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 1, 2007).
140. Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
141. See generally Kolev, 658 F.3d 1024; Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268
(11th Cir. 2002); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Boyd v.
Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1437 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (“[Section] 2310 sets up alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms or procedures, akin to arbitration, which consumers may be compelled
to exhaust before resorting to a court lawsuit.”).
142. See Daniel G. Lloyd, The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act v. The Federal Arbitration Act: The
Quintessential Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2003); but see Born & Raviv, supra note
49.
143. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
144. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
145. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised2010-e.pdf; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Pub. L. No.
101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990).
146. Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
147. Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 366 (2003).
148. Id. at 396 (“In today's heterogeneous world, cross-border investment will be chilled without a
willingness of all countries to accept arbitration.”).
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and increasing capital flow.149 Conversely, litigation is controlled by a set of rules
enacted solely by the situs’ government, creating distrust as foreign litigants fear
nationalist and ethnocentric biases.150
Arguments by those who oppose arbitrability of MMWA claims contend that
consumers would be exploited if warrantors could compel arbitration.151 Specifically, this constituency alleges that consumers frequently have bargaining power
inferior to that of their warrantor; therefore, it is not realistic for consumers to
bargain whether or not they will enter into an arbitration agreement and what the
provisions of that agreement will be.152 By allowing warrantors to dominate the
terms and availability of arbitration, consumers may easily be exploited. For example, initial arbitration expenses and attorneys’ fees may deter aggrieved consumers from bringing successful claims and receiving compensation.153 Additionally, by compelling arbitration, warrantors will often be able to avoid larger payouts to aggrieved consumers.154 This second problem for consumers may be further exacerbated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a recent Supreme Court
decision permitting warrantors to implement class action waivers in arbitration.155
Both factions present compelling arguments and articulate the various dangers that could result from siding against them. The concerns raised by this problem have prompted courts, commentators, and legislators to address the issue.156
Unfortunately, attempts to resolve the issue have fallen short. Taking an economist’s approach to the issue, this note argues that MMWA claims should be arbi___________________________
149. See id. at 366-69.
150. See id. at 369-70.
151. Guerin, supra note 4, at 20-21; Mace E. Gunter, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483,
1508-09 (2000); Lloyd, supra note 4, at 1. Lloyd describes this preference:
Creditors and merchants prefer the arbitral forum due to the lower likelihood of exposure to large
judgments, even in the wake of systematic misconduct. Additional reasons, perhaps equally as
compelling, include losing the right to a jury, the unavailability of pursuing a class action, discovery limitations, filing fees, and the inability to appeal an erroneous interpretation of law–all
hindering the consumer's pursuit of redress. One commentator even dubbed arbitration the ‘death
knell’ of consumer protection. Currently, the effort to avoid arbitration in a consumer setting is
one of the most frequently contested issues.
Id.
152. Guerin, supra note 4, at 4 (“The seller's boilerplate language becomes more like boilerplate
armor, skillfully crafted by legal counsel. In contrast, the consumer has no negotiation rights and
consequently, has no choice—the ‘take it or leave it’ theory—but to sign ‘on the dotted line’ and hope
to be satisfied with the product.”).
153. Allan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and Implementation Issues Which Should Be Considered By a Consumer Lender, 1113 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. L.
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 655, 689 (“Because some arbitration organizations impose filing and
hearing fees that exceed typical court fees, consumers sometimes contend that the arbitration clause is
unconscionable because it imposes an unreasonable financial burden and effectively denies them an
affordable forum.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2006) (providing provision for recovery of
attorneys' fees and costs for prevailing plaintiffs in litigation).
154. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 64-65 (noting that one study
found median verdict from jury is $264,700 and mean verdict from jury is $703,600, while arbitration
garners median award of $49,400 and mean award of $124,500).
155. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
156. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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trable. Presumably, any money saved by manufacturers and warrantors via arbitration will be allocated to research, production, and product improvement, indirectly
returning it to consumers. While consumers will theoretically suffer little to no
injury, the integrity of arbitration will be preserved, promoting both domestic and
international wealth creation.157 Additionally, while allowing MMWA claims to
be arbitrated hinders the purpose of the Act, it does not cripple it, as the MMWA
would continue to be a viable weapon for consumers.158 Skeptics may argue that
manufacturers or warrantors will simply pocket any money saved and consumers
truly will be aggrieved. To paraphrase Yogi Berra: in theory, theory and practice
are the same thing, but in practice, they are not.

2. Attempted Solutions
In 1998, the American Arbitration Association acknowledged the difficulty in
resolving this schism by promulgating a new protocol for arbitration of consumer
contracts.159 The protocol advocated greater disclosure of the presence and terms
of arbitration agreements, notice of the opportunity to use small claims court as an
alternative to arbitration, and the use of clearer contractual statements alerting
consumers that they are submitting to arbitration.160 While these efforts were
commendable, they garnered little judicial support and have failed to materially
impact merchant-consumer interactions.161
Another suggested solution is to force merchants and warrantors to advertise
their arbitration agreements along with any advertisements they make for their
warranties.162 Greater exposure to arbitration agreements may help consumers
educate themselves on the arbitral process before being confronted with a take-itor-leave-it sales contract. However, this solution may have little effect as many
such warnings have devolved into bouts of jargon being hurled at lay consumers.163
Congress has also made efforts to solve the issue it helped create. In 2009,
committee hearings were held nine separate times to decide the fate of the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would have amended the FAA by adopting predispute/post-dispute distinctions and barring all pre-dispute consumer arbitration
agreements.164 The bill never gained the support it needed as it was resubmitted
again in 2011 and once again failed.165 Should Congress pass such a bill, it would
provide a clear answer to the McMahon and Chevron tests, vitiating any judicial
___________________________
157. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
159. See
American
Arbitration
Association,
Consumer
Due
Process
Protocol,
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
160. See id.
161. Guerin, supra note 4, at 33 (“As demonstrated by the case law above, currently, the only state
that is avidly pursuing the consumer contract arbitration issue is Alabama. Skeptically, one would
assume that more than a protocol is needed to effect any change in industry.”).
162. Id. at 34.
163. Id.
164. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill was introduced on February 12, 2009, by Representative Henry Johnson and referred to the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law on
March 16, 2009. Previous identical bills died on the table. See S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.
3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
165. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
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difficulties. However, this could expose policy pitfalls articulated by those favoring arbitration of MMWA claims.166
Eventual resolution of this problem may require a Supreme Court decision,
which would presumably provide the final word on the MMWA’s statutory interpretation. The Court may be motivated to take the issue up now that Kolev has
created a split between the circuits.167 Given the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration
stance, Congress’ apparent intent to allow arbitration of MMWA claims, and a
current lack of uniformity in the law, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari
and overrule Kolev.168 However, assuming that the Court does not preside over the
issue, it is useful to evaluate the effect Kolev may have going forward.

3. The Current Impact of Kolev
While definitive resolution of the Kolev issue may one day be delivered, that
day has not yet come. Given the labyrinthine difficulty of the case and the Ninth
Circuit’s potential to address this issue again, it is worth examining what Kolev’s
impact on contemporaneous jurisprudence may have been. If Kolev stands as
precedent, it may serve as a circumvention of the Concepcion decision allowing
for class action waivers.169 While the Ninth Circuit did not address class action
waivers in Kolev, plaintiffs may begin to bring claims of MMWA infringement to
avoid arbitral proceedings where class action waivers would be valid, and pursue
litigation where such waivers would be invalid.170 Additionally, Kolev’s interpretation of the MMWA could have a profound effect on products liability cases as
many warrantors will have to plan ahead for litigation as opposed to an arbitral
proceeding, which is often set up to advantage the warrantor.171
The decision in Kolev evinces the Ninth Circuit’s continued preference favoring consumers and litigation over enforcement of the FAA.172 Although Kolev will
likely have a substantial impact in the Ninth Circuit, it is doubtful that impact will
___________________________
166. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
167. Rebekah Kaufman & Alexei Klestoff, Concepcion May Not Reach Claims Under the MagnusonMoss Act, JDSUPRA (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid
=c84ca573-fe78-4c5a-997a-c452053dbc98.
168. Recent Case, Arbitration--Fifth Circuit Holds Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims Arbitrable
Despite Contrary Agency Interpretation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (2003) (“Instead, a court
should conclude that the MMWA does not preclude arbitration; that given this lack of ambiguity, no
deference need be accorded to the contrary FTC interpretation; and that the courts' pro-arbitration
mandate requires the court to hold the claim arbitrable.”).
169. Kaufman & Klestoff, supra note 167.
170. Id.
171. Ray Hartman et al., Ninth Circuit Invalidates Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses under
Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, DLA PIPER PUBLICATIONS (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.dlapiper.com/global/publications/Detail.aspx?pub=6394&RSS=true; CURTIS R. REITZ,
CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT 23 (1978) (noting that
warrantor-created dispute mechanisms intended for binding arbitration are “flaw[ed], in that the unilateral establishment of a set of procedures for handling disputes by one of the disputing parties leaves
much to be desired”).
172. See Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
unconscionability of an arbitration agreement should be decided by a court and not an arbitrator);
Hoffman v. Citibank, N.A., 546 F.3d 1078, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting Citibank's class action
waiver would be substantively unconscionable under facts alleged, but remanding for more fact finding).
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affect courts outside that jurisdiction as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly delivered
arbitration opinions disfavored by the Supreme Court.173 If Kolev is not followed
by other courts, it does not necessarily mean that the MMWA would perish along
with it. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as other courts, have held that
while those bringing claims under the MMWA may be forced to arbitrate, they
will only be forced to do so if the arbitration agreement was disclosed in the written warranty.174 This is significant because arbitration clauses are rarely placed in
the written warranty, often allowing those claims to be litigated.175 So while Kolev
may eventually be scrapped, the MMWA will remain a relevant, albeit redacted,
part of warranty claims.

VI. CONCLUSION
The problem faced in Kolev is a complex one that has troubled Congress,
courts, and commentators, and no consensus has yet been reached. This issue may
be attributed to poor legislative drafting, misguided administrative regulations, or
lack of clear judicial precedent. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that Kolev has
failed to make an impact; it has reopened the issue of MMWA arbitrability that
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits seemed to have settled, potentially ripening the
issue for the Supreme Court.176 If the issue is not resolved by the Supreme Court
or a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, legislators and commentators will likely
continue to lobby their perspectives while warrantors will need to be wary of their
warranty agreements and jurisdictional differences among courts. Ultimately, the
intersection between the MMWA and FAA remains in limbo and Kolev’s withdrawal illustrates the ever-changing approach to that issue. Therefore, attorneys,
courts, warrantors, and consumers should be advised to stay current on these developments as they continue to form the legal backdrop against which standard
form warranties are written and consumer claims are handled.
TYLER BECKERLE

___________________________
173. See, e.g., Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct.
2772 (2010); Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2010);
Greenwood v. CompuCredit, 615 F.3d 1204 (2010), rev’d, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2011).
174. Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002); Cunningham v. Fleetwood
Homes of Georgia, Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 622 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Harnden v. Ford Motor Co., 408
F. Supp. 2d 300 (E.D. Mich. 2004); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Mathews, 848 A.2d 577 (Del. Ch.
2004); Larrain v. Bengal Motor Co., Ltd., 976 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Tropical Ford, Inc.
v. Major, 882 So. 2d 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Manly v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., Clearinghouse
No. 55,633 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 30, 2005).
175. Article, 12 Reasons to Love the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 11 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 127,
128 (2008).
176. Born & Raviv, supra note 49.
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